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Body Memory and the Unconscious 
 
Thomas Fuchs 
 
 
 
Introduction: psychoanalysis and phenomenology 
 
Psychoanalysis and phenomenology, two theories that arose at more or less 
the same time1, both considering themselves basic sciences of subjectivity, 
have nevertheless remained foreign to one another. The grounds for this are 
probably to be found primarily in their conflicting views of the role played 
by consciousness. To psychoanalysis, consciousness appeared only as a 
shimmering varnish concealing psychological forces and processes in un-
fathomable depths which are what is actually effective. For phenomenolo-
gy, on the other hand, consciousness rather was the medium or the light 
through which all phenomena come to be seen in the first place, and appear 
as such. Consciousness as the sphere of mere semblance (Schein) or of 
manifestation (Erscheinung) – is a pointed distinction that could be made 
between the two.  
 
Accordingly, they held contrasting views also of the unconscious: either it 
was considered the actual source of the psyche's life, the hidden meaningful 
structure and driving force, which made its way by various means, even in 
opposition to the conscious intentions of the subject. Or the unconscious 
had to be viewed as restricted to an implicit awareness that remained poten-
tially accessible to consciousness or reflection, and, in any case, could not 
basically be foreign to the subject. In Husserl's words:  
 
"What I do not 'know', what in my experience, my imagining, thinking, 
doing, is not present to me as perceived, remembered, thought, etc., will 
not 'influence' my mind. And what is not in my experience, be it ignored 
or implicitly-intentionally decided, does not motivate me even uncon-
sciously" (Husserl 1952, 231). 
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These two views seem hardly reconcilable. However, on closer analysis, 
psychoanalysis and phenomenology do in fact have a common starting 
point: it is in the Cartesian view of consciousness as "clear and distinct 
perception", the assumption that consciousness is transparent to itself 
insofar as its own contents are concerned. For Husserl, the "cogito" is the 
present evidence, the necessary “appresentation” of all contents in the 
observing consciousness, without which they would melt or escape into the 
unreality of past or future. All memories, all ideas, all the possibilities of 
consciousness, must cling, as it were, to this evident present so as not to 
vanish.  
 
But Freud's view of consciousness is not much different: conscious is only 
"… the idea that is present in our consciousness and which we perceive" in 
each case (Freud 1943, 29). Thus, consciousness is considered the space for 
current ideas or representations. The unconscious is then the space 
containing all the other ideas which are not present at a particular moment. 
Freud rejects an ambiguous knowing-unknowing consciousness for "… a 
consciousness of which one knows nothing seems to me many times more 
absurd than a psychic unconscious" (Freud 1940b, 243). Consciousness 
must be transparent to itself or it is not consciousness at all. 
 
Psychoanalysis thus rebelled against the classical philosophy of conscious-
ness, and not only failed to overcome it but, without being aware of it, even 
adopted its premises. The situation is similar to that in today's conflict be-
tween neurobiology and classical philosophy: The sovereign, autonomous 
conscious subject that neurobiology believes it must dethrone is itself 
merely a dualistic construct. Separated from its body and its life, restricted 
to present "mental states", the bodiless, and to this extent powerless, "ego" 
becomes easy prey to neurobiological reductionism, and the role of the un-
conscious as the actually powerful substrate is now taken over by the mate-
rial brain.  
 
Now the dimension of embodiment of the subject was increasingly brought 
to the fore by phenomenology as time went on, and it could just as easily 
have become the core of psychoanalysis. Freud, as is well known, did not 
only see the origin of the Ego in the body2. The body also played a decisive 
role in psychoanalytical drive theory, since this theory assumed a step-by-
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step development of partial drives, which are dominated by certain regions 
of the body, and whose "destinies" permanently affect the development of 
the individual. Nevertheless, despite this concept, the dualism of body and 
mind had a crucial impact also on psychoanalytic theory. For Freud, in the 
final analysis, drives are not phenomena of the lived body, but objective-
somatic quantities; and their so-called representations do not belong to a 
libidinous body of the subject but are already part of the psyche as an inner, 
hidden apparatus where drive derivatives and drive energies are converted 
into one another and distributed to various levels of the psyche – an 
apparatus which can only be decoded on the basis of external signs such as 
body-language or by way of speech. In the end, the body thus remained 
interesting only as the seat of symbolic or imagined meanings, as a primary 
projection field for the psyche, so to speak, which always had to be 
scrutinized for its hidden meanings. That mental phenomena could at the 
same time be bodily as well was not imaginable in the dualistic paradigm.  
 
With the idea of the "psychic apparatus", which doubtlessly goes back to 
Freud's own early brain theory, an entity had also been created that served 
as a sort of inner container for images and memories of external reality. 
Introjected as "object-representations", "imagos" etc., they populated the 
various compartments of the psyche and developed a life of their own with 
the help of the drive energies. In this way, the Ego remained separated from 
important parts of these compartments through radical ignorance: the 
topologically structured, dynamic unconscious, according to Freud, is basi-
cally different from the preconscious as the latent and implicitly known 
(Freud 1940c, 77f.). Between the pre-conscious and the unconscious stands 
the economical mechanism of repression, and both what is repressed and 
the repressing mechanism – i.e. the motivation for repression – elude 
consciousness. As evidence for this concept, Freud could point to bodily 
symptoms or to Freudian slips, which appeared alien or meaningless to the 
Ego, furthermore to the difference between manifest and latent dream 
content which is attributable to an unconscious censor, and, last but not 
least, to the resistance shown by the patient during analysis to becoming 
aware of what has been repressed.  
 
This radical separation of the unconscious, however, came at a high cost, 
for now it had to be assigned to the objectivity of the psychological 
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apparatus. Freud had discovered a paradox, namely that one "knows 
something that one simultaneously does not know" and that "one is struck 
with blindness while the eyes see" (Freud 1957, 175 note). He was only 
able to solve this paradox by the splitting of the psyche into two parts. As a 
consequence, the unconscious turns into an "internal foreign country", 
(Freud 1940c, 62), in other words to something external within oneself, 
whose meaning and effect are alien to the subject. 
 
At this point, however, we should remember Husserl's objection to a 
motivation which is entirely alien to the subject. Moreover, how should the 
subject be in the position to re-appropriate such an alien meaning, unless it 
was always his own meaning? Psychoanalytical therapy could then do no 
more than convey rational insights into the mechanisms of one's foreign 
inner life, and could not contribute to a genuine integration of one’s 
personality. The classical aim of psychoanalysis: "where id was, ego shall 
be", would then remain only a matter of explicit knowledge, not of actual 
self-appropriation.  
 
The phenomenological critique of this concept moved along various paths, 
of which I will only mention two: 
– Sartre saw the unconscious not as a circumstance imposing re-
strictions on the subject from outside, but as a basic modality of the 
subject's relationship to himself, namely, that of bad faith, "mauvaise 
foi" (Sartre 1958, 47ff.). The subject assumes an ambivalent 
relationship to himself, he allows himself, so to speak, to slide into 
an "intentional inattention": one doesn’t know something and 
doesn’t want to know it; one doesn’t see something and doesn’t want 
to see it, and in this way becomes the deceived and the deceiver in 
one. 
– Second, there is the possibility of taking the ambiguity of the lived 
body as the starting point, that means, its shifting between remaing 
tacit and becoming aware, as conceived by Plessner as well as  
Merleau-Ponty. Then it becomes possible to encounter the uncon-
scious in bodily behaviour, in day-to-day living and in the structures 
of the person's lived space. This would not be an unconscious in 
some unknown depths of the psyche, but unconscious in the 
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horizontal dimension, so-to-speak. Body memory plays a special part 
here, insofar as it turns a person’s bodily and inter-bodily 
experiences into implicitly effective dispositions, which provide the 
mostly unconscious basis for day-to-day living.  
The latter is the course which I will take in what follows. So the question 
will be: Can the unconscious be localized in the lived relationships and 
conduct of a person, in the horizontal dimension of the lived body and 
intercorporeality? How far can such a concept reflect elements of Freud's 
unconscious? – In what follows, I first want to develop the concept of body 
memory and the relational field that it constitutes, and then look for the 
structures of this field where the unconscious can, as it were, take up its 
abode.  
 
 
Body memory  
 
If, following Merleau-Ponty, we view the body not as the visible, touchable 
and sentient physical body but first and foremost as our capacity to see, 
touch, and sense, then body memory designates the totality of these bodily 
dispositions as they have formed in the course of our development –  in 
other words, in their historical dimension. In body memory, the situations 
and actions experienced in the past are, as it were, fused together without 
any of them standing out individually. Through the repetition and su-
perimposition of experiences, a habit structure has been formed: well-
practiced motion sequences, repeatedly perceived Gestalten, forms of ac-
tions and interactions have become an implicit bodily knowledge and skill. 
Body memory does not take one back to the past, but conveys an implicit 
effectiveness of the past in the present. This approach converges with the 
results of recent memory research on the central significance of implicit 
memory which is to some extent equivalent to body memory, though, as we 
will see, the latter comprises much more phenomena.  
 
The body is thus the ensemble of acquired and organically developed 
predispositions and capacities to perceive, to act, but also to desire and to 
communicate. Its experiences, anchored in body memory, cover the 
environment like an invisible network which relates us to things and to 
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other people. It is our permanent means to actualise our past and, with this, 
to make ourselves feel at home in situations. It is important to note that 
what is mediated and enabled by body memory is mostly forgotten in terms 
of explicit memory. An example may be seen in the capacity of typewriting 
which is a memory “in the fingers” unavailable for explicit knowledge 
(illustration: “keyboard”). 
 
Moreover, in the bodily experience structures, the others are always already 
included, they are pre-reflectively understood in expression and intended in 
desire. Before I can reflect on what I am communicating through my 
gestures or speech, my body always already creates the feeling of being-
with; it expresses itself through attitude and gestures, and at the same time 
reacts to the impressions of others. This "intercorporeality" (Merleau-Ponty 
1964, 168) forms a superordinate, intersubjective system in which, from 
childhood on, forms of bodily interaction are established and constantly re-
actualized. It comprises the self and the others, the conscious and the 
unconscious: "I do not have to search very far for others: I find them in my 
experience, lodged in the hollows that show what they see and what I fail to 
see (…) We are in no way locked inside ourselves" (Merleau-Ponty 1973, 
138f.). 
 
 
Body memory and life space 
 
Body memory thus forms not only an interior system restricted to the 
physical body. It also constitutes a sensorimotor, emotional and interactive 
field in which we, as embodied beings, constantly move and conduct 
ourselves; thus, it may also be regarded as the historical dimension of the 
body schema which is always already related to the environment too. What 
offers itself here is the terminology of Kurt Lewin's field psychology 
(1936), particularly the concept of the life space with its center in the lived 
body. In order to link it with the structures of body memory, I want to give 
a brief outline of this.  
 
As I mentioned, the life space is centred around the person and the person's 
body. According to Lewin, it is characterised by experienced characteristics 
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such as closeness or distance, narrowness or breadth, connectedness or 
separateness, attainability etc., and it is structured by physical or symbolic 
boundaries which offer resistance to movement. This produces more or less 
clearly bounded sectors such as the peripersonal space around one's own 
body, claimed territories (property, home), the sphere of influence which 
emanates from someone, but also prohibited or taboo zones. The lived 
space is further permeated by felt "field forces" or "vectors", in the first 
place those which attract and repel. Competing attractive or repulsive 
forces in the life space lead to typical conflicts such as attraction versus 
aversion, attraction versus attraction etc. They can be considered as 
conflicting directions of movement or possibilities which are offered to a 
person in a given situation. Moreover, the life space is characterized by 
effects of „gravitation“, „radiation“,  or by „curvatures of space”.  
 
A good example of conflicting field forces and curvatures is offered by the 
situation of a small child who is torn back and forth between his bond to his 
mother and curiosity (cf. Stern 1991, 101). The mother is first of all the 
"safe haven", the centre of gravity, so to speak, which curves the child's 
experienced space in such a way that he remains in her vicinity. The space 
thus acquires a gradient: the further the child moves away from the mother, 
the more empty or lonely the space becomes. While it condenses again 
around other, i.e. strange, people, the child rather makes a detour around 
them: the space curvature near them is "negative". Little by little, the 
child's exploratory drive looses his tie to his mother, so that it becomes 
possible to increase the distance against the gradient – only until the bond 
is stretched too much, and the child runs back to his mother in the end.  
 
This example is also a good illustration of the fact that the respective field 
structures are based on body memory, in this case, the history of the expe-
riences the child has had in closeness and security with his mother – 
attachment research has shown this in detail. From birth on, body memory 
incorporates an extract of typical experiences with others, thus acquiring 
dyadic patterns of interaction or “schemes of being-with” (Stern 1985), or 
an “implicit relational knowing”  (Stern, Lyons-Ruth 1998). 
 
Another proverbial example of body memory lies in the saying, “A burnt 
child dreads the fire” (German proverb), or "Once bitten, twice shy", which 
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illustrate the negative or aversive effect of body memory, in this case, of 
pain memory. A third example, finally, is given by the zones of prohibition 
which restrict the child’s movements so that his spontaneous impulses 
interfere with parental imperatives, namely, inasmuch these have left a 
negative mark and a negative gradient on his very life space.   
 
Consequently, the life space – depending on the respective experiences of a 
person – can bear varying significances, relevances or valences. In analogy 
to a physical field, "gravitational effects", invisible "curvatures" of space, 
or barriers can appear which restrict or prevent spontaneous movements. 
Particularly in psychopathology, we encounter various deformations of the 
lived space (Fuchs 2007), as, for instance, the implicit avoidance zones of 
phobic patients or the taboo zones of obsessive patients, which are based on 
certain past experiences sedimented in body memory. 
 
 
On the phenomenology of the unconscious 
 
With this, I have made a brief sketch of an approach and a terminology 
which permit the question of the unconscious to be put and answered in a 
different way. 
 
If we reject Freud’s idea of a topological unconscious beyond subjectivity – 
a separate intra-psychic process which impacts on the experiencing subject 
from outside, so to speak – then we may ask whether the unconscious 
might not be considered another mode of experiencing that manifests itself 
in the horizontal dimension of the lived body and the lived space. The par-
adigm for this would be the ambiguity of the body itself which, while see-
ing, always remains unseen, and of whose dispositions I often remain una-
ware, which in fact come to meet me from outside, namely in the form of 
the attractive or repelling objects, the affordances and field structures of my 
environment. Such an unconscious would then, as Merleau-Ponty writes, 
"… be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our 'con-
sciousness', but in front of us, as articulation of our field" (Merleau-Ponty 
1968, 180). It would be the unrecognized reverse side of our experience 
and conduct, or its other, hidden meaning. 
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As our starting point, let us first consider the field structure of a repressed 
wish. In his short story "Der Branntweinsäufer und die Berliner Glocken" 
(The brandy drinker and Berlin's bells), Heinrich von Kleist recounts the 
story of an alcoholic soldier who, after insistent preaching and punishment, 
has resolved to become abstinent but was found drunk after only three 
days. Asked how this relapse could have happened after all his good resolu-
tions, the soldier justified himself by saying that the devil must have had 
his hand in it because while walking through the town he suddenly heard 
the names of various brandies in the tolling of the bells - for example 
"Kümmel! Kümmel!" in the ringing of the town hall bell, "Pommeranzen, 
Pommeranzen" in the ringing cathedral bell and so on. In the end, he could 
not help being defeated by these insidious sounds.3  
 
While this humorous example relates only to a wish that was not actually 
repressed but merely suppressed by an act of will, it gives a fine 
illustration of the indirect way in which contrary bodily impulses or drives 
can get their way, namely from outside. This hidden role of the lived body 
may also be grasped in Polanyi’s (1967) terms: The lived body and its 
desires are the proximal component of the perceptual or affective field, and 
the perceived situation is the distal component; but the proximal 
component recedes from awareness in favour of the distal. We perceive the 
situation through the medium of the body.  
 
The experiential field is thus, so to speak, interspersed with a suppressed 
desire which becomes crystallised finally around certain perceptions – 
namely those which are sufficiently vague while offering a certain 
similarity for the purpose: in Kleist’s case the various chimes. The un-
certain or ambiguous is a particular place where a latent or hidden 
significance can take shape. The drive or the wish that was not satisfied 
breaks through circuitously and from outside so that, in principle, we can 
already recognize the defence mechanism of displacement. What is actually 
desired is fulfilled through something similar but less prohibited.  
 
A comparable interference of explicit intentions and implicit directions of 
meaning is also found in the various types of "Freudian slips". Freud 
himself says that "…slips are the result of two different intentions which 
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interfere with one another, of which one can be called the disturbed and the 
other the disturbing intention" (Freud 1940a, 56). Mishearing is most like 
the example of Kleist's soldier: a latently desired meaning is "interpreted" 
from a similar sequence of sounds. To take another example: She asks: 
“What would you like—bread and butter, or cake?”, while he unterstands: 
“Bed and butter”, thus manifesting his latent sexual intention.  
 
Similarly, with slips of the tongue, or of the pen, and with mislaying and 
losing things, another intention interferes with the explicitly intended 
action, so that “the right hand – literally – does not know what the left hand 
is doing”. Finally, with forgetting, an originally made but unpleasant 
intention is blanked out and replaced by others, for example, routine 
processes. Thus, in spontaneous bodily perceptions or actions which take 
place "of their own accord", the relevant latent intention wins through in 
spontaneous bodily enaction – in a reversal or a chiasm which is expressed 
by the prefix "mis-". 
 
The producer of the slip can now either immediately or after some brief 
thought recognise its significance and ascribe it to himself, or he finds it 
"senseless", in other words, alien to himself. For example, Freud writes the 
following concerning "misspeaking": 
 
"If later we present it [the intention on which the misspeaking was based] 
to the speaker, he may either acknowledge it as something familiar, so that 
it was only temporarily unconscious, or he may deny it as alien to himself, 
which means that it was permanently unconscious" (Freud 1940c, 77). 
 
It is on this difference, amongst other things, that Freud bases his categori-
cal distinction between the preconscious and the true dynamic unconscious 
which is excluded or repressed from consciousness "by living forces" 
(Freud 1943, 436). The defence mechanism and the corresponding re-
sistance to the latent meaning are based on the assumption that the 
inhibition and its motives are themselves excluded from consciousness. 
However, the question is whether this justifies establishing a special 
intrapsychic space for the dynamic unconscious. Against this, there is the 
merely gradual difference between a temporary and a permanent un-
conscious in the Freud quotation which I cited. In both cases, after all, we 
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are dealing mainly with a duplicity of intentions, to which only an 
additional repressive tendency is added in the second case. But if we do not 
assign the "living forces" of repression of which Freud speaks to an 
intrapsychic mechanism beyond consciousness, but see them rather as 
dynamic field forces, we will easily find models for them in the lived body 
and life space.  
 
The first thing that comes to mind would be the relieving posture adopted 
after sustaining an injury: spontaneously one avoids putting the injured 
limb at risk from dangerous objects and holds it back without having still to 
think of the event. Avoidance behaviour is thus incorporated into body 
memory. Moreover, I have already mentioned the zones of prohibition 
which face the child and operate against its approach through negative field 
forces until the child respects them automatically. We come one step closer 
to the dynamic unconscious with zones or objects which are taboo. For, 
unlike prohibition, the taboo has a special structure and effect in that it is 
not expressly formulated but is generated by the avoidance behaviour of 
others, like a negative curvature of the shared life space around what is 
prohibited. Taboos are most effective when they are not declared, and the 
members of the community are not even aware of them. The infringement 
of taboos is not necessarily punished with open penalties, but automatically 
generates feelings of shame, guilt or abhorrence in the offender, reinforced 
by the contempt and the ostracising silence of the others.  
 
In all these cases, experience and conduct are determined by negative or 
"repulsive" field forces exercising their effect unconsciously since the 
subject, like the "once bitten" person, has gradually extricated herself from 
the possible conflict. Avoidance has become an implicit, bodily pattern of 
behaviour so that what is potentially threatening in the environment is no 
longer consciously experienced. Nevertheless, repelling forces do not ap-
pear to consciousness as coming from outside but, in Hegel’s terms, as “its 
own otherness”. They remain co-extensive with the experiential field but as 
its negative. The manifest feelings of fear, guilt or shame which arise on 
stepping beyond the barriers in the life space were already latently present 
before, endowing these barriers with their unpleasant affective loading. 
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In the same way, in the case of a "slip", the dynamic unconscious puts up 
resistance to its becoming conscious. This resistance is itself not conscious, 
nor is it implicitly or preconscious, and yet on this account it is still not 
altogether outside consciousness. It is rather an ambiguity or duplicity of 
consciousness itself; in such a way that the subject, if she hits on the mani-
festation of the hidden meaning, at least has an inkling that it is asking her 
a question, namely about her own otherness. The unconscious, writes Mer-
leau-Ponty,  
"… cannot be a process ‘in third person’, since it is the unconscious which 
chooses what aspect of us will be admitted to official existence, which 
avoids the thoughts or situation we are resisting, and which is therefore 
not an un-knowledge but rather a non-recognized and unformulated 
knowledge that we do not want to take up. In an approximative language, 
Freud is on the point of discovering what other thinkers have more 
appropriately named ambiguous perception" (Merleau-Ponty 2007, 194). 
 
We can understand this ambiguity of consciousness with the example of 
another defence mechanism, namely projection. Here the beam in one's 
own eye proverbially becomes the splinter in another's eye; in other words, 
one perceives in others the impulses and motives against which one has 
built defences in oneself. Naturally, this perception is also ambiguous, 
since the excessive zeal with which the impulses in others are disapproved 
derives its energy precisely from the efforts one has to make to neutralize 
one's own impulses. The blind spot in self-awareness – and here Freud is 
doubtlessly right – does not result from a mere "overlooking", but from 
active and emotionally charged repression. Nevertheless, this repression 
remains the work and the latent effort of the subject herself, not of a 
subpersonal mechanism outside her. What originally was one’s own has 
been excluded and now appears in the outside as alien or repulsive, but the 
alien is actually nothing else but one’s own otherness. 
  
 
Trauma and reiteration 
 
Let us now turn to another phenomenon, namely, the unconscious effect of 
an emotional trauma which Merleau-Ponty sets out to interpret in his "Phe-
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nomenology of Perception". What is repressed, he writes, is generally like a 
phantom limb for an amputee inasmuch as a capacity or disposition 
continues in the body which is no longer congruent with the present. 
Habitual and current body come into conflict with one another. In a similar 
manner, repression creates an “empty space” in the current subjectivity 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 87), for the “negative” left by an experience which 
has not been dealt with interposes itself unnoticed before every new 
situation and thus imprisons the traumatised person in a past which is still 
present.  
 
"…(T)his fixation does not merge into memory; it even excludes memory 
in so far as … [the trauma] does not leave us but remains constantly 
hidden behind our gaze instead being displayed before it. The traumatic 
experience does not survive as a representation in the mode of objective 
consciousness … [but] as a manner of being and with a certain degree of 
generality" (ibid. 83).  
 
This description assigns the repressed trauma not to explicit but to body 
memory, which holds what is hidden "from sight" and goes on in a general 
manner or "style" of existence.4 The injury or violence has penetrated the 
body of the subject and has left behind a permanent sensitivity, a readiness 
to defend oneself. The traumatised person becomes hypersensitive to 
threatening, shaming situations similar to the trauma, even if this similarity 
is not consciously recognized, and tries to circumvent them. "The 
resistance is directed to a certain area of experience, a certain category, a 
certain type of memory" (ibid. 194). All the same, at every step, the victim 
may encounter something that reawakens the trauma in her. Often it hap-
pens that a permanent predisposition develops to react with fear and nerv-
ousness, to become alarmed every time the doorbell rings, a feeling of be-
ing followed or observed by unknown people.  
 
An impressive description is to be found in the memoirs of the Jewish writ-
er Aharon Appelfeld, who from his seventh to his thirteenth year of age 
experienced the Second World War hiding in the woods of the Ukraine:  
 
“More than fifty years have passed since the end of the war. I have 
forgotten much, even things that were very close to me – places in 
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particular, dates, and the names of people – and yet I can still sense those 
days in every part of my body. Whenever it rains, it’s cold, or a fierce 
wind is blowing, I am taken back to the ghetto, to the camp, or to the 
forests where I spent many days. Memory, it seems, has deep roots in the 
body.” – “The cells of my body apparently remember more than my mind 
which is supposed to remember. For years after the war, I would walk 
neither in the middle of the sidewalk nor in the middle of the road. I 
always clung to the walls, always staying in the shade, and always 
walking rapidly, as if I were slipping away. (…). Sometimes, just the 
aroma of a certain dish, or the dampness of shoes or a sudden noise is 
enough to take me back in the middle of the war (…). The war has 
infiltrated my bones.” – “… the palms of one’s hands, the soles of one’s 
feet, one’s back, and one’s knees remember more than memory. Had I 
drawn from them, I would have been overwhelmed with what I have seen 
(Appelfeld 2009, p. 50, 90, vii). 
 
Here it is not a particular episode, but an entire segment of his life that has 
left its mark on the body, more deeply and permanently, of course, than the 
autobiographic memory could have done: Proprioception, touch, smell, 
hearing, even certain kinds of weather can suddenly allow the past to come 
to life again, and even bodily pattern of movement, such as the hunted walk 
close to the wall, still imitates the behaviour of the fugitive.  
 
The effect of the trauma on the person can thus be viewed, first, as a specif-
ic deformation of her lived space corresponding to an unconscious avoid-
ance behaviour which he or she adopts towards the anxiety-provoking or 
"repelling zones". The lived space around these zones is to a certain extent 
negatively curved and prevents the free movement of life. Second, the life 
space is permeated with similarities in which the trauma approaches the 
traumatised person from outside, so that it is impossible to avoid it. For in 
one's attitude, one's stance, and in one's perceptive predispositions, one 
carries the trauma into one's world over and over again. 
 
We may finally relate this to the psychoanalytic concept of repetition 
compulsion. This concept is based on the clinical experience that patients 
continue to be drawn into the same, mostly damaging behaviour or 
relationship patterns even if they try to prevent this at the conscious level. 
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Their lived space is so to speak "positively curved" around these regions – 
in other words, these exercise an unnoticed attraction. If, for example, a 
person's early experiences were characterized by abusive relationships, this 
issue will determine also that person's later relationship patterns. The types 
of abuse may vary, but the implicit behaviour patterns deposited in body 
memory will have the effect of fulfilling her expectations and bring about 
the familiar type of relationship. These unconscious enactments, as they are 
called today, may also become tangible in the psychotherapeutic relation, 
where Freud, of course, regarded them as a form of transference. As he 
writes, we must  
 
"… say in analysis that the analysand remembers nothing at all of what 
has been forgotten and repressed, but he acts it out. He does not reproduce 
it as a memory but as action, he repeats it, naturally without realizing that 
he is repeating it. For example, the analysand does not say that he 
remembers being defiant and incredulous towards the authority of his 
parents, but he behaves in this manner towards the doctor" (Freud 1946, 
129).  
 
The unconscious pre-history of intersubjective relations is re-enacted 
through the intercorporeal body memory. However, this means that the 
unconscious is not a hidden chamber of the psyche any more, but is 
interwoven in the life style, in the bodily conduct of a person, as a sub-
structure which remains hidden from her personally, but becomes visible to 
others because, in the final analysis, it is always implicitly directed to those 
others themselves. The “blind spot” in the center of consciousness can also 
be viewed as the other side of the intersubjective relationship, in which our 
own being-with-others must necessarily remain hidden from us, so that this 
dark side of ourselves can only be illuminated in our communication with 
others. For in my world the others dwell "… in the hollows that show what 
they see and what I fail to see" (Merleau-Ponty 1973, 138f.). 
 
 
Conclusion 
From the point of view of a phenomenology of the lived body, the uncon-
scious is not an intrapsychic reality residing in the depths "below con-
sciousness". Rather, it surrounds and permeates conscious life, just as in 
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picture puzzles the figure hidden in the background surrounds the fore-
ground, and just as the lived body conceals itself while functioning as a 
medium of being-towards-the-world. It is an unconscious which is not 
located in the vertical dimension of the psyche but rather in the horizontal 
dimension of lived space, most of all lodging in the intercorporeality of 
dealings with others, as the hidden or reverse side of day-to-day living. It is 
an unconscious which is not to be found deep inside the individual but in 
his or her relationships to others, as an unnoticed interbodily field.5 
 
Unconscious fixations are like certain restrictions in a person's space of po-
tentialities produced by an implicit but ever-present past which declines to 
take part in the continuing progress of life. Their traces, however, are not 
hidden in an inner psychic world but manifest themselves rather as "blind 
spots", "empty spaces" or curvatures in the lived space: in the "slips" in 
speech and action; in the relationship patterns into which a person repeated-
ly blunders, in the actions which are avoided without being aware of it; in 
the spaces which are not entered, the opportunities offered by life which 
one does not take, and even does not dare to see. Such traces may be rec-
ognised as "negatives" so to speak, in the form of inhibitions or omissions 
which are characteristic of a person. They can also become symbolically or 
physically present in neurotic or psychosomatic symptoms. The symptom 
is to this extent neither meaningless nor a defective habit – as learning the-
ory assumed6 – nor is its meaning to be found beyond itself, in the uncon-
scious interior. Rather, it lies in the intercorporeal expression, in the inter-
active field, even if this meaning is not evident, but must be understood and 
interpreted. 
 
The unconscious is thus absence in presence, the unperceived in the per-
ceived (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 245f.). Like a figure blanks out the ground 
from which it stands out, thus consciousness, perception and language con-
ceal their reverse side, namely the unconscious, the unperceived, and the 
silence, which are always bound up with them. This reverse side, however, 
does not remain fully concealed but expresses itself in reversals, chiasmatic 
entanglements, in an ambiguity of consciousness: One does not know 
something and does not want to know it; one does not see something and 
does not want to see it – in other words, one looks past it intentionally-
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unintentionally. Consciousness is not fully transparent to itself because it 
hides itself from itself.  
 
This duplicity of consciousness corresponds to the ambiguity of the body 
whose modes of appearing fluctuate between the thematic and the unthe-
matic, between the physical (Körper) and the lived body (Leib). But it also 
corresponds to the ambivalent, conflict-prone nature of our existence itself 
where we, precisely as natural, embodied beings, can always confront our 
own instinctive and natural side as well. This is what constitutes the con-
tradictoriness or, to speak with Plessner (1975), the "eccentricity" of the 
way we relate to ourselves, the constant conflict between spontaneity and 
reflectivity, “body” and “soul”, nature and nurture, conscious and 
unconscious. One could then accuse Freud that even he, for all his 
scepticism, was too generous to humankind in that he tried to relieve our 
consciousness of this inherent conflict by placing our opposing will in a 
separate space belonging to the unconscious – thus withdrawing this will 
from our own responsibility. 
 
 
                                                          
1 As is well known, both Husserl's "Logische Untersuchungen" and Freud's "Traumdeutung" 
appeared in 1900. 
2 Cf. Freud 1940b, 253. 
3 Kleist 1984. – The story is also cited by Graumann (1960, 151) as an illustration of the 
motivational basis of perspectivity.  
4 „comme un style d’être“, in the French original (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 98).  
5 "(…) the latency of psychoanalysis is an unconscious that is beneath conscious life and within 
the individual, an intrapsychic reality that leads to a psychology of depth in the vertical 
dimension. (…) the latency of phenomenology is an unconscious which surrounds conscious 
life, an unconsciousness in the world, between us, an ontological theme that leads to a 
psychology of depth in the lateral dimension" (Romanyshyn 1977). 
6 "Learning theory assumes no 'unconscious' causes whatsoever but views neurotic symptoms 
simply as learned habits. There is no neurosis at the bottom of the symptom, only the 
symptom itself " (Eysenck & Rachmann 1972, 20). 
 
